My research falls in the intersection of ethics, moral psychology, and ancient philosophy (especially, Aristotle). I explore ways in which our moral agency extends beyond capacities of the rational mind, i.e., reflective and deliberative capacities, and what that means for our understanding of moral responsibility.

In ancient philosophy, my research focuses broadly on the ethical and cognitive significance of emotions and the imagination. Despite the attention researchers have given to Aristotle’s discussions of emotions in his Rhetoric, how emotions bear on ethical action and on ethical judgment remains insufficiently understood. I explore these issues in a series of papers. While imagination (phantasia) has been relatively well-studied, its role in the psychological underpinnings of experiential knowledge (empeiria) and moral learning remains to be clarified. My research on this subject is part of an ongoing book project.

In my contemporary research projects, drawing on Aristotle’s works and feminist philosophy, I develop fresh accounts of (i) agency with respect to emotions and (ii) neglected aspects of moral agency, and its implication for moral responsibility.

Papers in Progress:

Apt Anger and Moral Agency

Aristotle on the Structure of Memory

Why Pain is a Feminist Issue?

In picture, Bernie Sanders Nathan